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HIDE THAT SYNDICATED JUNK IN THE CLOSET! A CASE FOR
CREDIT RISK RETENTION IN THE CLO MARKET
ADAM ALTMAN*
INTRODUCTION: THE FALL OF AN ICON
The Chicago Tribune, founded in 1847, is the most widely distributed
daily newspaper in the Great Lakes region.' The newspaper that once pro-
claimed itself the "World's Greatest Newspaper," is famous for its quality
reporting from a highly accomplished staff, which, over the years has in-
cluded legendary columnists such as Gene Siskel, Mike Royko, and Bob
Greene. 2 The Chicago Tribune's November 3, 1948 front-page was, per-
haps, its most famous. The headline, "DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN,"
was misleading.3 But, the photograph of President Truman smiling exuber-
antly while holding up a copy of the Tribune became an American icon.
In contrast to the lighthearted effects of the erroneous headline from
1948, the Chicago Tribune's front page on December 9, 2008 included a
story that would have much greater potential consequences for the venera-
ble newspaper. Michael Oneal and Phil Rosenthal wrote the headline story,
"Tribune Co. Files for Chapter 11."4 The Chicago Tribune's parent compa-
ny, which also owned the Los Angeles Times, WGN America, and the Chi-
cago Cubs, was bankrupt.5
Just one year earlier, real estate mogul and billionaire, Sam Zell, pur-
chased the Tribune Company for $8.2 billion.6 Mr. Zell financed the pur-
chase primarily through debt instruments known as syndicated bank loans.7
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, December 2012; CDO Analyst, U.S. Bank.
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1. Circulation averages for the six months ended: 3/31/2011, AUDIT BUREAU OF CIRCULATIONS,
http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/newstitlesearchus.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
2. JAMES O'SHEA, THE DEAL FROM HELL: How MOGULS AND WALL STREET PLUNDERED
GREAT AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 36, 148 (1st ed. 2011); Gene Siskel died 10 years ago today, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 20, 2009.
3. Dewey Defeats Truman, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1948, at 1.
4. Michael Oneal & Phil Rosenthal, Tribune Co. files for Chapter II, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2008, at
1.
5. Id.
6. David Carr, At Flagging Tribune, Tales ofa Bankrupt Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,2010, at 1.
7. Id
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This crushing debt burden combined with a decline in the overall media
industry and a struggling national economy, led to what Mr. Zell described
as the "perfect storm" for the Tribune Company.8 Ultimately, the Tribune
Company defaulted on more than $10 billion of syndicated bank loans.9 It
was the largest default in the history of the syndicated bank loan market.'0
Syndicated loans, like the ones that the Tribune Company issued in
2007, are a contentious issue within the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act")."I Various industry participants
including banks, hedge funds, and law firms, argue that securitizations of
syndicated bank loans should be excluded from the Dodd-Frank risk reten-
tion requirements.12 This note focuses on the imprecise and possibly inac-
curate assumptions upon which these arguments rely. Part one introduces
syndicated loans and collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs"). In addition,
part one highlights the risk retention provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that
apply to CLOs and syndicated bank loans. Part two of this note examines
the plain language and the legislative intent of the relevant section of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Finally, part three of this note suggests that CLOs and
syndicated bank loans should not be excluded from the Dodd-Frank risk
retention requirements.
I. THE PRIMROSE PATH TO THE CLO MARKET
Some critics of the Dodd-Frank risk retention mandate argue that
Congress should have been more lenient in providing exceptions and ex-
emptions from the rule. 13 Specifically, they argue that CLOs consisting of
syndicated bank loans should not be subject to the risk retention provi-
8. Oneal & Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 1.
9. Syndicated Bank Loans: 2008 Default Review and 2009 Outlook, MOODY'S CREDIT POLICY 2
(Mar. 2009); see also Sharon Ou & Kenneth Emery, Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920 -
2008, MOODY's GLOBAL CREDIT POLICY 19 (Feb. 2009).
10. Syndicated Bank Loans, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining that Tribune Company was the largest
syndicated loan default between 1996 and 2008. n 2009, Lyondell Chemical eclipsed this when it
defaulted on more than $18.8 billion of loans).
I1. Compare Bram Smith, Comment on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Credit Risk Retention,
THE LOAN SYNDICATION AND TRADING ASS'N (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.Ista.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=13958 [hereinafter LSTA Comment Letter]
(arguing that risk retention should not apply to open market CLO managers), with Credit Risk Reten-
tion, 76 Fed. Reg. 24090 (proposed Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rules] (proposing
risk retention rules for all classes of securitizations).
12. See LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11; see also Impact of Dodd-Frank's Risk Retention
Rules on CLOs: Regulatory Agencies' Failure to Account for Crucial Differences among Asset Classes
has Potential to Stunt CLO Market, Causing Real Harm to Commercial Lending Markets, MORRISON
FOERSTER 4 (May 25, 2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/1 10525-Impact-of-Dodd-
Franks-Risk-Retention-Rules-on-CLOs.pdf.
13. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 17.
936 [Vol 87:3
RISK RETENTION IN THE CLO MARKET
sions. 14 The first step in evaluating these arguments is to understand both
syndicated bank loans and CLOs. Moreover, some background on the per-
tinent section of the Dodd-Frank Act will illustrate its applicability to the
CLO market.
A. Syndicated Bank Loans
Syndicated bank loans originated in the 1980s, and they have since
become a popular method by which corporations raise capital.15 By 2010,
syndicated loan commitments in the United States alone reached $2.5 tril-
lion.16 In contrast to bilateral bank loans between one bank and one bor-
rower, syndicated bank loans involve multiple banks or investors who
commit to lending to the corporate borrower.17 Typically, a large bank
leads or arranges the syndicate of lenders.' 8 Some syndicated loans, such as
the ones that the Tribune Company issued, can involve billions of dollars
and dozens of lenders.19 This loan structure allows the borrower to raise
more money than it could from a single lender. At the same time, the pro-
cess requires the borrower to maintain contact with only the arranger.20
Therefore, the borrower can raise all of the capital that it needs without the
extensive administrative costs that it would incur if it had to borrow
through many smaller loans from numerous individual lenders.
1. Differences Between Syndicated Bank Loans and Corporate Bonds
In addition to the distinction between syndicated and bilateral loans,
syndicated bank loans also differ significantly from corporate bonds.
Whereas syndicated bank loans are usually private transactions amongst
corporate borrowers and their lenders, corporate bonds are usually availa-
ble to the investing public at large. Some corporate bonds are even traded
on the New York Stock Exchange.21 In 2011, market participants traded
14. See generally LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11.
15. William Chew & Steven Miller, STANDARD & POOR'S , A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 7
(Sept. 2011) [hereinafter S&P GUIDE], https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdflLoanMarketguide.pdf
16. Credit Quality of the Shared National Credit Portfolio Improved in 2010, FED. RESERVE BD.
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20100928a.htm.
17. FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: STRUCTURES AND
ANALYSIS 44 (2d ed. 2006).
18. Id. at 46.
19. Jonathan Stempel, Tribune files bankruptcy plan, lenders cry "unfair," REUTERS (Apr. 12,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/12/us-tribune-lenders-idUSTRE63B33X20100412.
20. See S&P GUIDE, supra note 15, at 7. While the syndication process can involve more than one
arranger, the borrower usually deals with the lead arranger. Even when the borrower deals with multiple
arrangers, it is still more efficient than dealing with each individual lender.
21. Compare LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 4-5 (explaining that syndicated lenders
typically have a relationship with the borrowers), with Corporate Bonds, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY
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more than $400 billion worth of syndicated bank loans. 22 By contrast, the
annual trading volume for corporate bonds is approximately $4 trillion,
more than ten times the size of the secondary market for syndicated bank
loans.23
Aside from the differences in market size and scope, syndicated loans
differ from corporate bonds in a few other critical ways. First, syndicated
loans are typically secured by a lien on the borrower's assets.24 As a result,
syndicated lenders have priority over the claims of all other types of credi-
tors in the capital structure;25 the borrower must repay the syndicated lend-
er before paying any other lender or investor.26 In addition, syndicated
bank loans usually involve more covenants than corporate bonds.27 Cove-
nants give lenders some financial control over the borrower, which can
mitigate the risks of default or other losses. 28 Some of the more common
covenants include restrictions on the borrower's use of the loan proceeds,
the borrower's capacity to issue additional debt instruments, and the bor-
rower's ability to change its ownership.29
Another significant difference between corporate bonds and syndicat-
ed bank loans involves their rates of interest. Whereas corporate bonds are
usually fixed-rate investments, syndicated bank loans are usually variable-
rate investments. 30 Syndicated bank loans typically bear interest at a rate
AUTH., apps.finra.org/investorinformation/smart/bonds/306000.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (ex-
plaining that corporate bonds trade in over-the-counter markets between bond dealers and brokers, and
some trade on the NYSE).
22. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 5 (quoting LSTA Trade and Settlement Study, Feb.
3,2011).
23. See Statistics, SEC. INDUSTRY AND FIN. MARKETS ASS'N,
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (download U.S. Bond Market Trading Volume) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2012). The secondary market is the trading market in which buyers and sellers trade
syndicated bank loans. By contrast, the primary market is where the initial investor buys a portion of a
syndicated bank loan directly from the borrower or arranger. Through December 2011, the average
daily trading volume for all publicly traded corporate bonds was $15.6 billion; 256 trading days per
year multiplied by the average of $15.6 billion, yields an average annualized trading volume of $3.997
trillion.
24. Gary D. Chamblee & Jolie A. Tenholder, Converging Markets: Leveraged Syndicated Loans
and High-Yield Bonds, COMMERCIAL LENDING REVIEW 7 (Nov.-Dec. 2005).
25. Peter J. Nigro et al., Some Evidence On The Secondary Market Trading Of Syndicated Loans,
8 J. OF Bus. & EcON. RES. 33, 35 (May 2010).
26. Id.
27. Glenn Yago & Donald McCarthy, The US. Leveraged Loan Market: A Primer, MILKEN
INSTITUTE 5 (Oct. 2004), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdfloanprimer_1004.pdf
28. Id.
29. Chamblee & Tenholder, supra note 24, at 12.
30. Yago & McCarthy, supra note 27, at 5. For variable rate loans the applicable interest rate
changes at specified intervals-usually monthly or quarterly-based on market conditions. For fixed
rate debt instruments, the applicable interest rate remains constant throughout the life of the debt,
regardless of market conditions.
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equal to the London Interbank Offer Rate ("LIBOR") 31 plus an amount of
interest known as the "spread." 32 The purpose of the spread is to compen-
sate lenders for the credit risk associated with the particular borrower. 33 In
other words, LIBOR is the reference or starting point, and the spread is the
additional borrowing cost attributed to the riskiness of the borrower. For
example, some of the syndicated loans that the Tribune Company issued in
2007 had an interest rate of LIBOR plus 3%, for a total rate of 5.52%.34
2. CLOs Play a Key Role in the Syndicated Bank Loan Market
The flexible characteristics of syndicated bank loans make them at-
tractive to borrowers and lenders.35 In addition, the growing secondary or
trading market for syndicated loans gives lenders a viable way to exit the
investment before maturity.36 As a result of these factors, the syndicated
bank loan market has grown dramatically; banks originated only $37 mil-
lion worth of loans in 1987, but by 2004, that number was a staggering $1.2
trillion. 37 Moreover, new types of lenders have entered the market and
helped to fuel the growth of the syndicated bank loan market. Although
banks are imperative in facilitating these loans, they are no longer the pri-
mary source of capital for syndicated loans.38
While a large bank usually arranges the group of lenders for a syndi-
cated bank loan, the remaining lenders are often other banks, finance com-
panies, and institutional investors. 39 Institutional investors are groups of
investors including hedge funds, pension funds, and CLOs. 40 Of these insti-
tutional investors, CLOs were, in 2007, the "dominant form of institutional
investment" in the syndicated loan market, accounting for "60% of primary
activity by institutional investors." 41
31. BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last visited Feb. 24,
2012). LIBOR is the rate at which banks in the London wholesale money market can borrow from each
other; the rate at which an individual Contributor Panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by
asking and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just prior to 11:00 am London
time.
32. Yago & McCarthy, supra note 27, at 5.
33. Id.
34. Tribune Co., Credit Agreement (Form DEFA14A) 2 (May 17, 2007) (definition of "Applica-
ble Margin").
35. Nigro et al., supra note 25, at 35.
36. Id. at 36.
37. Id. at 33.






B. The ABCs of CLOs
Explaining why CLOs are such large investors in syndicated bank
loans requires understanding some of the basics of CLOs. Collateralized
loan obligations are pools of debt obligations; these pools often include
syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans, and high yield corporate
bonds.42 CLOs are a type of collateralized debt obligation ("CDO").43 Oth-
er types of CDOs such as collateralized insurance obligations ("CIOs") or
commercial real estate obligations ("CRE CDOs"), are comprised of insur-
ance contracts or commercial real estate assets. By contrast, CLOs hold
high-yield corporate debt.44 The manager of the CLO loan pool uses the
principal and interest payments from the corporate loans as collateral to
issue bonds to other institutional investors. The CLO manager is usually an
asset manager, such as Prudential Investment Management, Oak Hill Advi-
sors, or Pacific Investment Management. 45 The manager uses proceeds
from the bond issuance to buy more corporate loans for the pool. 46 Through
this structure, CLO bondholders gain exposure to a diversified pool of cor-
porate debt, without having to expend the resources necessary to manage
the loan pool. The CLO manager benefits by earning fees for managing the
pool. Furthermore, some managers hold a portion of the CLO's equity47-
the difference between the incoming payments from the loan pool and the
outgoing payments on the bonds.
The CLO manager separates the bonds that it issues into different
classes or tranches based on the risk characteristics of each bond.48 Bonds
with the first claim to the cash flow from the underlying pool are the least
risky because they absorb losses from the underlying collateral pool only
after all of the lower tranches absorb such losses. 49 Because they entail less
42. Andreas A. Jobst, Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs): A Primer, THE SECURITIZATION
CONDUIT, 2003, at 8-9.
43. Presentation by Malick Sy, CDOs Risk Management & All About CDOs, ICO-OP.NET 17,
http://www.ico-op.net/downloads/CDO%20Risk%2OManagement%20Slides.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2012). iCo-op.net is a business focused on solutions for governance, risk, management, and compli-
ance; the source is a presentation on risk management for CDOs.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Karen Sibayan, S&P to Step Up CLO Manager Monitoring, LEVERAGED FIN. NEWS (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.leveragedfinancenews.com/news/190992-1.html.
46. David L. Batty, Dodd-Frank's Requirement of "Skin in the Game" for Asset-Backed Securi-
ties May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 19 (Mar. 2011).
47. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON RISK
RETENTION 47 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter FRB REPORT].
48. See Fabozzi et al., supra note 17, at 7 (discussing the structure of CDOs and CLOs).
49. Joshua Coval et al., Re-Examining the Role of Rating Agencies: Lessons from Structured
Finance 9 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished manuscript)
(http://www.people.hbs.edulestafford/Papers/CJSRatings.pdf).
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risk, these senior or first priority classes command a lower interest rate.50
By contrast, holders of the most subordinated class of bonds receive the
highest interest rates in exchange for the lowest priority claim to the under-
lying debt pool's cash flows. 51
Between 1997 and 2007, new CLO issues grew from $51 million to
$85.8 billion.52 Numerous factors contributed to this tremendous growth in
CLO issuance. In simple terms, however, the driving force behind the
growth of the CLO market was its attractive risk and return profile. 53 Dur-
ing this time, many CLO bonds yielded higher interest rates than some
corporate bonds.54 At the same time, however, rating agencies and inves-
tors underestimated the default risks of highly leveraged debt instruments,
like CLO bonds.55 Therefore, relative to corporate bond investors, CLO
bond investors thought they were earning more on their investments with-
out taking any additional risk.
An investment that yields high returns in exchange for low risk is a
conundrum.56 During the phenomenal growth period for CLOs, however,
investors began to expect this financial phenomenon. 57 A few interrelated
factors stoked these expectations: portfolio diversification theory combined
with advancements in credit risk modeling and investor reliance on rating
agencies.
50. FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 17, at 7 (exhibit 1.3, showing the coupon for different classes of
CLO bonds).
5 1. Id.
52. Challenges Facing CLOs... and the Loan Market, THE LOAN SYNDICATION AND TRADING
Ass'N 5 (2009) [hereinafter LSTA White Paper],
http://www.1sta.org/WorkArea/downloadasset.aspx?id=6170.
53. See Anna K. Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis 7
(Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Harvard College) (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/students/dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf) (describing how the structural mechanics of CDOs
allowed investors to receive higher returns on their investments, while at the same time not violating
their risk limits).
54. Fabozzi, supra note 17, at 10 (exhibit 1.4).
55. S&P GUIDE, supra note 15, at 10 (explaining that CLOs issue debt that is as much as 10 to 11
times their equity); MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 3600 LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
IMPLOSION, AND HOW To AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 118 (1st ed. 2009) (noting that investors
perceived CDOs as a "win-win proposition" because they offered measurable risks in exchange for
relatively high returns).
56. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (explaining risk and return as a
rule of finance: the "expected returns-variance of returns" rule; theory is based on the assumption that
the rational investor will only take on more risk in exchange for higher expected returns).
57. See ZANDI, supra note 55, at 118, 123-125 (explaining that CDOs offered "precisely cali-
brate[d]" risk in exchange for high returns; also illustrating that "investing with leverage can be lethal,"
and some investors, like two of the Bear Steams hedge funds, did not fully appreciate the risks of
investing in leveraged CDOs).
2012] 941
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1. Portfolio Theory and Credit Risk Modeling
An investor who owns a piece of a CLO that holds many different
types of bank loans is theoretically taking less risk than if the investor
merely owned a single bank loan. The theory that a diversified portfolio of
assets is less risky than a non-diversified portfolio is not a recent develop-
ment in finance and economics.58 In 1952, Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz
explained that "[a] portfolio with sixty different railway securities, for ex-
ample, would not be as well diversified as the same size portfolio with
some railroad, some public utility, mining, various sort[s] of manufactur-
ing, etc."59 CLO managers rely upon this theory of diversification when
picking loans for underlying pools of collateral. 60 Therefore, the entire
collateral pool is not susceptible to downturns in specific economic sectors.
Similar to diversifying amongst different industries, the CLO's gov-
erning documents typically specify numerous other limitations regarding
the types of assets that the CLO can hold.61 For example, many agreements
specify that only a certain percentage of the assets can come from a particu-
lar geographic region. Furthermore, other stipulations may limit the time-
to-maturity of the assets, their interest rate characteristics, and the expected
recovery rates for defaulted assets. 62
In addition to diversification, CLO managers have relied upon ad-
vancements in credit risk modeling to decrease the theoretical risks of the
portfolio. 63 The Gaussian copula model revolutionized risk assessment for
CLOs. 64 David X. Li developed the model, and in March, 2000, The Jour-
nal of Fixed Income published Li's work. 65 Li studied the correlations be-
tween two assets and their associated risks of default. 66 His resulting model
58. See Markowitz, supra note 56. Harry Markowitz developed this theory in 1952; he won the
1990 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, in part based on his portfolio theory.
59. Id. at 89.
60. See Yago & McCarthy, supra note 27, at 26 (explaining that CLOs buy assets with different
credit risk profiles, and then securitize the assets as bonds).
61. See Press Release, Fitch Rates Blue Ridge CLO 2009-1 'AAA, Outlook Stable, REUTERS (Apr.
29, 2009, 14:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/29/idUS223518+29-Apr-
2009+BW20090429 (explaining that the transaction documents define the concentration limitations for
the portfolio of bank loans).
62. FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 47.
63. Mark Whitehouse, How a Formula Ignited Market That Burned Some Big Investors, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005.
64. Id
65. David X. Li, On Default Correlations: A Copula Function Approach, 9 J. OF FIXED INCOME 8
(2000).
66. See id at 21 (Li modeled the correlation between two assets by analyzing the change in prices
for credit default swaps on one asset while a related asset was on the brink of default).
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gave portfolio managers a tool by which they could assess the risks of de-
fault for each loan in a CLO pool. 67
Armed with Li's Gaussian copula model, CLO market participants be-
came more confident in their ability to accurately measure the risks of in-
vesting in a given CLO.68 Moreover, CLO managers used this model and
combined it with the fundamentals of portfolio diversification. These two
factors gave investors confidence that CLOs were fundamentally sound and
grounded in robust financial models.
2. Rating Agencies: How to Build "Investments" Out of "Junk"
Financial modeling gave the CLO market a boost in confidence, but
another factor played a major role in the proliferation of CLOs. Many CLO
bonds were highly rated by one or more of the three largest and most re-
spected credit rating agencies. 69 Rating agencies have existed since 1909
when John Moody published ratings on railroad securities. 70 The Comp-
troller of the Currency ("OCC") solidified the importance of the rating
agencies in 1936 when it issued regulations requiring banks to hold only
investment-grade securities.71 As a result, bond issuers needed ratings so
that they could market their bonds to banks. In addition to the OCC regula-
tions for banks, other agencies adopted similar ratings-based investment
requirements for insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. 72
Furthermore, in 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
recognized Moody's, Standard & Poor's ("S&P"), and Fitch as Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs"). 73 Since then,
issuers have relied upon the NRSROs to rate their debt offerings.
By 2006, the SEC recognized five NRSROs, 74 but only Moody's,
Fitch, and S&P rated CLO bonds. 75 While investors typically used ratings
67. See Li, supra note 65.
68. Whitehouse, supra note 63.
69. Barnett-Hart, supra note 53, at 17.
70. Amy Borrus et al., The Credit-Raters: How They Work and How They Might Work Better,
BUS. WEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 38 (S&P and Fitch soon followed Moody's).
71. Jerome S. Fons, Tracing the Origins of "Investment Grade, " MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE
GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH 2 (Jan. 2004), http://www.moodys.com.bribrasil/pdf/InvGradeOrigins.pdf
(explaining that the term "investment grade" originated from regulators and industry participant who
were trying to distinguish between high quality and more speculative investment choices).
72. Borrus et al., supra note 70, at 38.
73. Id.
74. The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets: Hearing
before the Sen. Comm. On Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Christopher Cox, Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange Commission).
75. U.S. SEC. & Exc. COMM'N, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS,
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT
9432012]
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from NRSROs "as a starting point for classifying and understanding securi-
ties and their associated risks,"7 6 some CLO investors may have used rat-
ings as the cornerstone of their investment decisions.77 Accordingly, when
rating agencies assigned high ratings to CLO bonds,78 investors assumed
that such bonds entailed very low risk of default. Investors who had previ-
ously been skeptical of CLO bonds could now flock to them with the com-
fort that an NRSRO had utmost faith in the investments.
Ratings from NRSROs may have attracted CLO bond investors who
would have otherwise chosen not to invest in such bonds. More important-
ly, however, high ratings from the NRSROs opened the doors to huge sums
of capital from investors who did not have the choice to invest in CLO
bonds, absent such ratings. 79 Many institutional investors, like pension
funds, are generally prohibited from investing in instruments that are not
investment-grade.80 Each individual bank loan within a CLO pool might
not carry an investment-grade rating. For example, Standard & Poor's rated
the Tribune Company BB- in 2007, which is below investment-grade.81
Accordingly, many institutional investors could not invest in the Tribune
Company's syndicated bank loans.
Although low ratings prohibited many investors from buying Tribune
Company loans outright, CLOs created a back-door through which institu-
tional investors could gain exposure to lower rated and higher yielding
loans, like those of the Tribune Company. This back-door exists because
rating agencies often assign higher ratings to CLO bonds than to individual
loans that are the underlying collateral for those bonds.82 This phenomenon
occurs because CLO bonds are backed by a diversified pool of bank
loans.83 Moreover, CLO bond issuers prioritize principal and interest pay-
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1 (July 2008) [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON CREDIT RATING AGENCIES]. The
SEC investigated only the three rating agencies that were active in the CDO and RMBS markets.
76. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 5.
77. Dennis Vink & Frank J. Fabozzi, Non-US Asset-Backed Securities: Spread Determinants and
Over-Reliance on Credit Ratings 4 (Yale International Center for Finance, Working Paper No. 09-13,
2009), (http://icfpub.som.yale.edu/system/fileuploads/2493/original/09-13.pdf.1265649569).
78. Moody's highest rating is "Aaa"; Standard & Poor's highest rating is "AAA"; Fitch's highest
rating is "AAA." See Investing in Bonds,
http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=10&subcatid=68, (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
79. Bamett-Hart, supra note 53, at 7.
80. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 2; see also Borrus et al., supra note 70, at 39 (explaining that
investment grade bonds are those rated BBB or better).
81. Peggy Hwan & Emilie Courtney, Tribune Co.'s $10.1B Secured Financing Rated BB-/Watch
Negative (Recovery Rating: 2), STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS DIRECT, (Apr. 19, 2007),
http://dm.epiqll .com/onlinedocuments/trb/exhibits/npp%20exhibits/.%5CNPP0378.pdf
82. See Vink & Fabozzi, supra note 77, at 6 (citing the example that while rating agencies down-
graded corporate bonds for General Motors and Ford to junk status, they simultaneously upgraded some
of the securitizations that owned those bonds).
83. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 8.
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ments to bondholders based on the level of seniority or tranche of each
bond.84 By diversifying assets and prioritizing cash flows, CLO bond issu-
ers created investments that appeared worthy of higher ratings than those of
the individual loans in the collateral pool. Therefore, if an NRSRO as-
signed investment-grade ratings to CLO bonds, institutional investors were
free to invest in such bonds, regardless of the "junk" -like the Tribune
Company-was the foundation for those bonds.85
By the middle of 2007, the credit rating agencies had assigned their
highest available ratings to over 37,000 structured finance products, worth
about $5 trillion.86 These staggering numbers represented 99 percent of the
triple-A credit market, and created a false sense of security in the CLO
bond market. 87 Investors relied upon the rating agencies to accurately
measure and report the default probabilities and quality of CLO bonds.88 In
some extreme cases, investors may have used ratings in lieu of their own
research and analysis. 89
Prior to CLOs, most institutional investors could not invest in high
yielding bank loans because such loans were not investment-grade assets.90
With the help of advanced financial modeling and the rating agencies,
however, CLO managers combined a diversified group of risky assets into
one large pool. The diversified pool then became the collateral for invest-
ment-grade bonds in which large institutions could invest.91 As a result,
investors' demand for CLO bonds increased dramatically, and CLO issuers
supplied these bonds in record numbers. 92
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2; see also Chamblee & Tenholder, supra note 24, at 8 (explaining that "junk" is a
description on any asset that is rated below investment-grade. While this line between junk and invest-
ment grade is slightly different depending on which rating agency is rating the asset, an asset rated BB-
qualifies as "junk" by the standards of any of the rating agencies).
86. Saskia Scholtes & Richard Beales, Top Rating Proving Crucial to Structured Finance Sector,
FIN. TIMES, May 17, 2007, http://www.ft.com/int/cms/s/0/2 1e5032e-0413-1 Hdc-a93 I -
000b5dfl 0621 .html#axzz1d20csnGC. "Structured finance products" include collateralized loan obliga-
tions, collateralized bond obligations, collateralized debt obligations, syndicated loans, and other in-
struments.
87. Id.
88. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 3.
89. Vink & Fabozzi, supra note 77, at 4. Fabozzi and Vink conclude that investors probably did
not base their decisions solely on ratings, but that they likely evaluated the reasoning behind the ratings
in making investment decisions. Regardless, such investors would still be relying almost exclusively on
the findings of the rating agencies. Moreover, Fabozzi and Vink's conclusions are based only on their
study, which is not necessarily indicative how market participants behaved.
90. Borrus et al., supra note 70, at 38.
91. Barnett-Hart, supra note 53, at 7.
92. See Whitehouse, supra note 63. Li's model helped market participants calculate the default
probabilities for the underlying collateral pool. It "fueled explosive growth" in the securitization market
because investors are more likely to invest in products if they think that they can accurately model the
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C. Dodd-Frank's Risk Retention Regime
On January 24, 2008, the chief economist for the National Association
of Realtors reported that the United States was experiencing the worst
housing market "in many, many years and possibly going back to the Great
Depression." 93 The housing market collapse may have been the primary
cause of the "Great Recession," but mortgage-backed CDOs were the fuel
for the precipitous rise and fall of housing prices between 1998 and 2009.94
Congress reacted to the severe economic problems by passing the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.95 While prevent-
ing future housing market calamities may have been Congress' primary
concern, the Dodd-Frank Act also addressed problems in the syndicated
loan and CLO markets.96
The Dodd-Frank Act addresses numerous banking and securities laws,
and it affects every financial institution in the United States.97 Section
941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act adds Section 15G to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 98 This new provision of the Exchange Act
requires federal banking agencies and the SEC to change the way in which
issuers and investors manage asset-backed securities.99
Pursuant to Section 941 's mandate, two of the banking agencies, the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
proposed rules on credit risk retention ("Notice of Proposed Rules").100
Subsequently, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, signed on (all the
signatories to the Notice of Proposed Rules are hereinafter referred to as
the "Agencies") in support of the joint proposal.101 Consistent with Section
risks of that investment. Prior to Li's model, CLO investors and issuers had limited tools for estimating
the risks of CLO bonds.
93. Michael M. Grynbaum, Home Prices Fell in '07 for the First Time in Decades, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2008, at 1.
94. See Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24095-24096.
95. Batty, supra note 46, at 13-14.
96. See Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24092 (introducing the proposed rules man-
dated by Section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act; this Section addresses securitizations of all assets, not
just assets related to the housing market).
97. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-l l(b)(1) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b)).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-l l(b)(1) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b)).
100. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24090.
101. See id. at 24090. While the FRB and the FDIC were the first Agencies to approve the Joint
Rules, all the other Agencies approved the proposal shortly after; all six agencies authored the Notice of
Proposed Rules.
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941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposed rules require securitizers to
retain not less than five percent of the credit risk associated with any secu-
ritization transaction.102 Section 941(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act defines a
"securitizer" as either "an issuer of an asset-backed security; or a person
who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities transaction by selling
or transferring assets."l 03 Furthermore, the Notice of Proposed Rules sum-
marizes a securitization transaction as "a transaction involving the offer
and sale of ABS by an issuing entity."' 04
In the "General Definitions and Scope" section of the Notice of Pro-
posed Rules, the Agencies lay out the different parties to a deal that could
be required to retain the five percent credit risk. 05 The proposed rules pro-
vide that "a sponsor of a securitization transaction [must] retain the credit
risk of the securitized assets."1 06 The Agencies explain that this approach
makes sense "in light of the active and direct role that a sponsor typically
has in arranging a securitization transaction and selecting the assets to be
securitized." 107 In Footnote 42 of the Notice of Proposed Rules, the Agen-
cies further clarify that CLO managers fall squarely within this definition
of sponsor: "the CLO manager generally acts as the sponsor by selecting
the commercial loans . .. for inclusion in the CLO collateral pool, and then
manages the securitized assets once deposited in the CLO structure."108
After the Agencies released the Notice of Proposed Rules, they re-
quested public comments on the rules.109 During the comment period,
which ended August 1, 2011, various industry participants argued that
CLOs comprised of syndicated bank loans should not be included in the
risk retention requirements. 110 These opponents of the proposed rules
claimed that Footnote 42 of the Notice of Proposed Rules exceeded the
Agencies' rulemaking authority under the Dodd-Frank Act, and that it was
contrary to the legislative intent of Section 941 of the Act.I 1 Furthermore,
the opponents argued that CLOs containing syndicated bank loans should
be exempt from the risk retention rules because CLOs have performed well
in the wake of the worst global economic conditions since the Great De-
102. Id. at 24099.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 1(b) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act § 941(a)).
104. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24098.
105. Id. at 24100.
106. Id at 24098.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 24098 n.42.
109. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (June 7, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-121 .htm.
110. See LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 2; see also HAHN ET AL., supra note 12, at 4.
111. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 8.
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pression.11 2 Finally, they contended that requiring risk retention for CLO
managers would hamper the CLO market, which would then cause a chain
reaction resulting in harm to the U.S. economy.113
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE AGENCY INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION 941
CLOs should not be exempt from the Dodd-Frank Act's credit risk re-
tention rules. Moreover, in most CLO transactions, the best candidate to
retain that risk is the CLO manager. Footnote 42 of the Notice of Proposed
Rules requires CLO managers to retain some of the credit risk in the under-
lying assets of a CLO pool."11 This rule is consistent with both the plain
language and the legislative intent of Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Congress' broad goal of Section 941 was to "encourage sound lending
practices, restore investor confidence, and permit securitization markets to
resume their important role as sources of credit for households and busi-
nesses."' 15 Risk retention addresses this goal by aligning the incentives of
issuers, investors, and corporate borrowers. CLO managers should be sub-
ject to the Section 941 risk retention requirements. Exempting them from
the rules would help to promote the "lack of discipline" that allowed secu-
ritization transactions "to harm investors, consumers, financial institutions,
and the financial system.""l 6 Alternatively, where the legislative intent of
Section 941 is unclear, the Agencies have the authority to interpret it in
such a way that would apply the risk retention rules to CLO managers.
A. CLO Managers Fall Within the Plain Language ofSection 941
Congress passed Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act to require
securitizers to retain some of the credit risk of the loans that they securit-
ize. 117 The legislative intent behind Section 941 is to require securitizers or
sponsors of asset-backed securities to have "'skin in the game' [by] align-
ing their economic interests with those of investors in asset-backed securi-
ties."'" 8 CLO managers are both "sponsors" of asset-backed securities, and
112. Id at 14.
113. See Batty, supra note 46, at 22-26 (hypothesizing that syndicated bank loans are vital to
corporations; CLOs are vital to syndicated loans; regulation that restricts the CLO market will stifle
corporate growth and ultimately inhibit the national economy).
I14. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note I1, at 24098 n.42.
115. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 37 (2010).
116. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24095.
117. Id at 24095-24096.
118. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
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they are "securitizers."ll 9 Accordingly, they fall within the plain language
of the statute, and the Agencies should require CLO managers to retain
credit risk. To understand why, it is imperative to look at the mechanics of
a typical CLO transaction and to examine the' statutory definitions of
"sponsor" and "securitizer."
1. The Fundamentals of a CLO Securitization
In a typical syndicated bank loan CLO transaction, the manager initi-
ates the securitization by partnering with an investment bank.120 In some
cases, the CLO manager is a subsidiary of, or has a significant relationship
with the investment bank.121 The investment bank provides financing for
the manager to begin purchasing the syndicated bank loans that will even-
tually become the underlying collateral pool for the CLO bonds.122 The
manager continues to accumulate collateral, which it stores in an entity
usually referred to as a "warehouse." 23 In the next phase of the transaction,
the CLO manager sets up a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle.124
Ultimately, the special purpose vehicle buys the pool of bank loans from
the warehouse; it then uses the asset pool as collateral to issue the CLO
bonds to investorS. 125
The special purpose vehicle is necessary because it shields the CLO
bondholders from any creditors of the manager or other institution who
sells the collateral to the special purpose vehicle.126 After the manager
transfers the collateral pool, the assets are "'legally isolated' and conse-
quently are no longer available to the seller or its creditors."' 27 In other
words, if the CLO manager becomes insolvent, its creditors have no claim
to the assets that the manager transferred to the special purpose vehicle.
Because the CLO manager is often a large asset manager or bank subsidi-
ary like Credit Suisse Asset Management, ING Investment, or Golden Tree
119. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24098.
120. FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 22.
121. Id.
122. See id (explaining that the investment bank provides the warehouse facility; the investment
bank funds the warehouse with a line of credit, and the CLO manager uses these initial funds to pur-
chase syndicated bank loans).
123. See CDO Managers Win Back Warehouse Access, SECURITIZATION.NET (June 8, 2007),
http://www.securitization.net/article.asp?id=1&aid=7397 (discussing warehouses for CDOs, but the
creation of a CLO is logistically the same as a CDO).
124. FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 10.
125. Id.
126. Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and the Securitization Markets, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
ASs'N 2 (Feb. 1, 2002), http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/SPV-Discussion-Piece-Final-FebOl.pdf.
127. Id.
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Asset Management,128 investors would be unlikely to buy CLO bonds ab-
sent the bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle structure.
2. CLO Managers Are "Securitizers" Under the Plain Language of the
Dodd-Frank Act
Section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act creates Section 15G of the Ex-
change Act. The new Section 15G(a)(3) defines the term "securitizer" as:
(A) an issuer of an asset-backed security; or
(B) a person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities trans-
action by selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, in-
cluding through an affiliate, to the issuer. 129
The CLO manager is not the issuer of the asset-backed security; the
special purpose vehicle is the issuer. Accordingly, the manager is not a
securitizer under the Dodd-Frank Act's first definition of the term. In many
cases, however, the CLO manager does fit into the second category of
securitizers. In most, and "perhaps even the vast majority" of CLOs, the
manager is responsible for organizing and initiating the transaction by
transferring the CLO collateral to the special purpose vehicle.130 In those
cases, the CLO manager is a "securitizer" under Section 15G(a)(3), and
thus subject to the statute's risk retention provisions.
While the CLO manager is usually the securitizer, in some transac-
tions, other parties might qualify for that distinction. In "balance-sheet
CLOs," for example, a bank that originated loans will transfer those assets
from its balance sheet to a special purpose vehicle, which will ultimately
become a CLO.131 The purpose of a balance-sheet CLO is for the originat-
ing bank to transfer loans off its balance sheet so that it has the capital to
originate new loans. For some balance-sheet CLOs, the originating bank
will hire a third-party to be the CLO manager.132 In such cases, the CLO
manager would not be subject to Dodd-Frank's risk retention rules because
it would not be the party "who organizes and initiates" 33 the transaction.
Instead, the originating bank would be the securitizer, and thus responsible
to retain not less than five percent of the credit risk.
128. CLO Awards 2011, CREDITFLUX (2011), http://media.cvc.com/lib/docs/155448-
cloawards201 lwinnersfinalists.pdf.
129. 15 U.S.C. §780-1 l(b)(1) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act §941(b)).
130. Overview of the Proposed Credit Risk Retention rules for Securitizations, MAYER BROWN
LLP 47-48 (Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER],
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=10782&nid=6.
131. Jobst, supra note 42, at 2.
132. MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER, supra note 130, at 48.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 780-1l(b) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act § 941(a)).
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Like balance-sheet CLOs, in "reverse-inquiry CLOs," the manager is
probably not the securitizer. A reverse-inquiry CLO exists where one or
more investors initiate the transaction by specifying the types of bank loans
in which they plan to invest. 134 The investors work with an asset manager
to structure the transaction and to accumulate collateral that fits within their
specified guidelines.135 The manager is responsible for organizing and
operating the collateral pool, but the investor is the chief architect of the
transaction. In these transactions, the manager is more like an agent to the
investor, rather than an independent third-party. For purposes of risk reten-
tion, the investor "organizes and initiates" the CLO by "indirectly"l 36
transferring the assets of the collateral pool through the CLO manager.
Accordingly, the manager would not be responsible for retaining the credit
risk in a reverse-inquiry CLO.
Unlike balance-sheet and reverse-inquiry CLOs, the manager is the
securitizer in most CLO transactions.137 But, market participants argue that
CLO managers should not be subject to the Dodd-Frank Act's risk reten-
tion rules. Contrary to the plain language of the new Section 15G(a)(3) of
the Exchange Act, the Loan Syndication and Trading Association
("LSTA") contends that CLO managers are not securitizers under the stat-
ute. 138 In its comment letter in response to the Notice of Proposed Rules,
the LSTA argued that "the manager does not organize and initiate" the
ABS transaction by "directly or indirectly" selling or transferring any as-
sets to the CLO.139 While the LSTA provided no further detail in support of
its assertion in the comment letter, its arguments rest on the assumption that
in many CLO transactions the "warehouse" is the entity that transfers the
assets to the special purpose vehicle.140 Specifically, the LSTA argues that
no transfer or sale of assets is necessary because the collateral warehouse
simply evolves into the special purpose vehicle. 141 In most CLO transac-
tions, however, the collateral manager initiates the warehouse, buys the
collateral for deposit in the warehouse, and then structures a sale of the
134. MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER, supra note 130, at 48.
135. Id.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 780-11(b) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act § 941(a)).
137. MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER, supra note 130, at 47-48.
138. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 9. The*LSTA is a trade association that represents
participants in the syndicated loan market.
139. Id.




collateral from the warehouse to the bankruptcy-remote special purpose
vehicle.142
The warehouse and the special purpose vehicle are separate entities. If
they were not, standard accounting rules would dictate that the transaction
would not be a true sale, enabling the collateral pool and its subsequent
bonds to be subject to the claims of the collateral manager's creditors.143 In
other words, if the LSTA was correct and the warehouse simply evolved
into the special purpose vehicle, the structure would not be bankruptcy-
remote, and investors would not be willing to buy its bonds. Therefore, the
LSTA's legal argument is unworkable, and the CLO manager must be a
"securitizer" under the plain language of Section 15G(a)(3) of the Ex-
change Act.
3. CLO Managers are also "Securitizers" Because They Are "Sponsors"
In addition to satisfying the definition of "securitizer" under the plain
language of Section 15G(a)(3), CLO managers are also "sponsors" pursu-
ant to SEC Regulation AB, as promulgated under the Exchange Act.144 The
Notice of Proposed Rules uses the term "sponsor" interchangeably with the
statute's second definition of "securitizer."l 45 The Agencies explain that
the entity who "organizes and initiates the asset-backed securities transac-
tion by selling or transferring assets" is "substantially identical" 146 to the
definition of "sponsor" in Regulation AB.147
The Dodd-Frank Acts defines "securitizer" by adopting Regulation
AB's definition of "sponsor." Therefore, it is logical that Congress intend-
ed to also rely upon the SEC's explanatory comments regarding the defini-
tion of "sponsor." In Section 4.01 of the SEC's Manual of Publicly
Available Telephone Interpretations, the SEC Division of Corporation
Finance explains that "[w]hether a party is considered a 'sponsor' involves
a facts and circumstances analysis of whether its actions bring it within the
definition of Item 1101(1) of Regulation AB."l 48 This interpretation of the
definition suggests that the statutory language is not all-inclusive. Instead,
an entity might be construed as a sponsor of an asset-backed security based
142. See MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER, supra note 130, at 47-48. The CLO manager is the "spon-
sor" because "no other party transfers the collateral."
143. Tarun Sabarwal, Common Structures of Asset-Backed Securities and Their Risks 4
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 258, 262 (Fall 2006).
144. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101 (2011).
145. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note I1, at 24098.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N DIv. OF
CORP. FIN. 2, http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/cftelinterps regab.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Moreover,
in its submission of the final rule and request for comment on Regulation
AB, the SEC further elaborated on the definition of "sponsor."l 49 The SEC
clarified that even where the collateral assets pass through multiple parties
before arriving in the special purpose vehicle, "it will be clear in nearly all
instances as to which party was in the position of organizing and initiating
the securitization transaction and thus is the sponsor."so
The SEC's various comments on the meaning of the word "sponsor"
convey the impression that the regulator is concerned more with substance
than with form. Specifically, regardless of the complexity or number of
parties to an asset-backed securities transaction, the "sponsor" is the party
who organizes and initiates the transaction.151 Accordingly, for the purpos-
es of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress' reliance upon the SEC's definition of
"sponsor" conveys Congress' belief that the CLO manager-the party usu-
ally responsible for organizing and initiating the CLO-is a "securitizer."
Thus, CLO managers are "securitizers" both under the plain language
of the Dodd-Frank Act and under the SEC's definition of "sponsor" in
Regulation AB. Moreover, the fundamental structure of CLOs requires
someone to organize and initiate the transaction and to transfer the pool of
syndicated bank loans to a special purpose vehicle. In the "vast majority"
of CLOs, that someone is the CLO manager.152 Therefore, the Dodd-Frank
Act requires the CLO manager to retain "not less than 5% of the risk asso-
ciated with [the] securitization transaction."1 53
B. The Agency Interpretation of the Statute Carries the Day
Even if the plain language of the new Section 15G of the Exchange
Act was ambiguous, the Agencies' interpretation would prevail. Citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the LSTA
argues that the Agencies' proposed rules exceed their rulemaking authori-
ty.154 While Chevron covers only final agency rules, not proposals, chal-
lenging the Agencies' proposed rules under its holding would be
unsuccessful even if Chevron did apply. Moreover, if the Agencies adopt
the proposed rules subjecting CLO managers to risk retention, as this note
advocates, the Court's holding in Chevron will support the Agencies' inter-




152. MAYER BROWN WHITE PAPER, supra note 130, at 47-48.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 780-11(b)(1) (as added by Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b)).
154. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 8.
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pretation of the term "securitizer" under Section 15G of the Securities Ex-
change Act.
Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., courts must give "deference to administrative interpretations" of the
statute at issue.155 In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that where a statute
is ambiguous, "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter."156 In addition, the Court explained that when Congress leaves gaps in
a statute for an agency to fill, the resulting rules "are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."1 57
In the case of Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act, Congress'
intent is clear: "the Federal banking agencies and the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission shall jointly prescribe regulations to require any
securitizer to retain an economic interest in a portion of the credit risk."
Accordingly, the Agencies' proposed rules' 58 carry out Congress' intent by
requiring securitizers, including CLO managers, to retain risk. Applying
Chevron, "that is the end of the matter."1 59
Assuming arguendo that the statutory definition of "securitizer" is un-
clear, the Agencies' interpretation of that term is controlling as long as it is
"based on a permissible construction of the statute."1 60 The Agencies' defi-
nition of the words "securitizer" and "sponsor" is neither "arbitrary" nor
"capricious" because the Agencies merely interpreted Section 15G of the
Exchange Act by referring to the definition of the word "sponsor" in Regu-
lation AB of the Act. Moreover, applying the term "securitizer" to CLO
managers is not "manifestly contrary to the statute" because Congress in-
tended to impose risk retention provisions on "those who issue, organize, or
initiate asset-backed securities."1 61 While CLO managers do not issue the
asset-backed securities (the special purpose vehicle is the issuer),162 they
unquestionably organize and initiate them.
CLO managers fit squarely within Congress' definition of the word
"securitizer" in Section 15G of the Exchange Act. Even if Congress' intent
is not clear, the Court's holding in Chevron gives the Agencies latitude to
155. 467 U.S. 837, 842-844 (1984).
156. Id. at 844.
157. Id.
158. See generally Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11.
159. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 at 842.
160. Id. at 843.
161. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128 (2010).
162. FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 10.
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interpret and apply the term "securitizer" in any way that is consistent with
reasonable statutory construction. 163 In Footnote 42 of the Notice of Pro-
posed Rules, the Agencies explained that CLO managers are
securitizers.1 64 The Agencies' interpretation is consistent with Congres-
sional intent and the plain language of Section 15G; both suggest that CLO
managers should be subject to the Dodd-Frank Act's risk retention rules.
III. CREDIT RISK RETENTION FOR SYNDICATED BANK LOAN
CLOS IS PRUDENT POLICY
In addition to the persuasive legal reasoning discussed above, prudent
public policy also favors credit risk retention for CLO managers. While
CLOs outperformed other securitization transactions during the past several
years,165 their risks are similar to those of the products that helped cause
the ongoing economic downturn. Moreover, risk retention is an appropriate
tool to mitigate the risks of CLOs becoming a catalyst for the next econom-
ic meltdown. Finally, the Agencies' proposed risk retention rules will not
stifle economic recovery.
A. CLOs Are Susceptible to the Same Risks as Other Securitized Products
CLOs should be subject to the Dodd-Frank Act's risk retention provi-
sions because they have structural flaws that pose risks to the national
economy. According to the LSTA, "Open Market CLOs did not have a part
in causing the financial meltdown of 2008."166 By contrast to CDOs con-
sisting of subprime residential mortgages, CLOs were admittedly not as
instrumental in causing the financial crisis. However, the tremendous
growth of the CLO market between 1997 and 2007167 was symptomatic of
the loose lending standards that undoubtedly contributed to the financial
disorder beginning in the summer of 2007. More importantly, even if CLOs
were not a direct cause of the most recent financial crisis, credit risk reten-
tion will help ensure that they do not trigger a future financial meltdown.
Despite outperforming other securitized products like commercial and
residential mortgage-backed CDOs, the CLO market has, nonetheless, ex-
163. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 at 843-44.
164. Notice of Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 24098 n.42.
165. The Impact of Risk Retention on CLOs and Other Means of Aligning Incentives, THE LOAN
SYNDICATION & TRADING ASS'N 2 (2011),
http://www.Ista.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspxid= 1904.
166. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 3. The LSTA refers to CLOs that hold syndicated
bank loans as "Open Market CLOs" because syndicated bank loans are widely traded in the open
secondary market.
167. LSTA White Paper, supra note 52.
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perienced widespread problems since 2008.168 Between December 2008
and December 2009, the rating agencies downgraded sixty-five percent of
the CLO bonds that they had originally rated triple-A.169 Likewise, rating
agencies downgraded eighty-four percent of double-A rated CLO bonds,
and almost one hundred percent of the bonds rated lower than double-A.170
Furthermore, the default rate for syndicated bank loans soared from less
than two percent in 2007 to almost ten percent in 2009.171
While only six of approximately six hundred CLOs experienced
events of default since 2008,172 CLOs have inherent structural weaknesses
that could ultimately lead to economic calamity. Most notably, CLOs take
advantage of the same ratings inefficiencies that allowed the subprime resi-
dential mortgage-backed CDO market to expand and to ultimately destabi-
lize the national economy. Moreover, the incentives of the CLO manager
are not always aligned with those of the investors.
1. CLOs Exploit a Broken Ratings System
One of the primary reasons why CLO bonds attracted so much capital
in recent years is that they offer investors high ratings and attractive re-
turns. The high ratings are, however, concerning for two main reasons.
First, rating CLO bonds is a very complex undertaking, and rating agencies
used flawed models to accomplish this task.173 Furthermore, the ratings
process is rife with conflicts of interest. The securitization market should
not rely upon flawed rating systems. Instead, the foundation of this market
should be engaged investment managers making prudent decisions that
ultimately affect their own capital; requiring these managers to retain credit
risk achieves this goal.
i. (Junk + Junk) x (Pooling + Tranching) = AAA?
Part one of this note explored how rating agencies assign "investment-
grade" ratings to CLO bonds because of both their tranche structures and
their diversified underlying collateral poolS.1 74 In the typical CLO, for ex-
ample, the manager constructs the underlying collateral by purchasing 150-
168. See FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 62-63.
169. Id. at 62.
170. Id.
171. A SYNOPSIS OF THE BANK LOAN MARKET, HOTCHKIS & WILEY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT Chart
5 (2011), http://www.hwcm.com/assets/documents/Marketing-Pieces/Newsletters/Synopsis-of-the-
Bank-Loan-Market-HW-High-Yield-2Ql1-Newsletter.pdf.
172. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 7.
173. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 6.
174. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 8.
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250 different syndicated bank loans.175 Each loan by itself may not be an
investment-grade asset, but the manager spreads the risk of default by pur-
chasing loans from different economic sectors and from different geograph-
ical regions. 176 Although this approach to portfolio management is
grounded in sound investment fundamentals,1 77 rating agencies had mini-
mal experience in analyzing default probabilities for these pools of assets
and their ensuing CLO bonds. 178
For over a century, investors have relied upon the ratings agencies'
acumen in analyzing individual debt instruments.179 Rating an individual
loan involves assessing the borrower's expected cash flows and the likeli-
hood of default.' 80 By contrast, rating a pool of over two hundred bank
loans is "far more complicated." 81 The primary obstacle to rating large
pools of loans is that analysts must make assumptions regarding the corre-
lations between the different assets in the pool.1 82 In other words, the rating
agency must first assign the probability of default for each individual loan
in the collateral pool. The agency must then try to figure out the probabili-
ties of multiple borrowers defaulting in tandem, also known as default cor-
relation.183 Because of the complexities of rating CLOs, the rating agencies
relied upon new financial formulas, such as David X. Li's Gaussian copula
model.184
In addition to the difficulties of rating a diversified pool of assets, the
rating agencies overestimated the benefits of the tiered or tranched CLO
structure. Agencies rate each class or tranche of bonds based on its level of
seniority and associated claim to the principal and interest payments of the
underlying collateral. 185 CLO bonds that have the highest priority claim to
the principal and interest payments are perceived as the least risky class,
thereby receiving the highest ratings.186 By contrast to the AAA- rated
bonds with the first claim to payments, the bonds that are lower in priority
175. LSTA White Paper, supra note 52, at 6.
176. Jennifer Banzaca, Collateralized Loan Obligations, 3 THE HEDGE FUND L. REPORT 1, 1 (Apr.
2, 2010), http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/CollateralizedLoanObligations.pdf.
177. Markowitz, supra note 56, at 89.
178. Coval et al., supra note 49, at 3-4, 8 (explaining that rating agencies have almost a century of
experience in rating single issues, but they have relatively little experience-one decade's worth-in
rating securitized pools of assets).
179. Id. at 4, 8.




184. See id. Rating agencies used the Gaussian copula to estimate default correlations.
185. Id.
186. See Sabarwal, supra note 143, at 163.
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receive lower ratings.' 87 In other words, "senior tranches only absorb losses
after the junior claims have been exhausted, allowing [the senior bonds] to
obtain credit ratings in excess of the average rating on the collateral
pool." 88
While this tiered ratings system seems like a logical scheme to lower
the risk of the senior tranches of bonds, it does not account for the possibil-
ity that many of the underlying syndicated bank loan borrowers could all at
once stop making principal and interest payments. 189 For example, when
the housing market slumped in 2007, the economy began contracting and
credit markets seized in 2008.190 Businesses struggled to earn profits and
even stay solvent. Against this backdrop, the Tribune Company defaulted
on more than $10 billion worth of syndicated bank loans.191 But, the eco-
nomic damage was not isolated to one aggressive financier's buyout of a
declining media company; Tribune's default was merely a symptom of a
much larger problem. The fallout was also not contained to one business
sector or one geographic region.192 Rather, wide swaths of corporate bor-
rowers from all industries and geographical locations could not make
scheduled principal and interest payments on their syndicated bank
loans. 193 As a result, the lowest rated CLO tranches "were wiped out and
CLO senior notes were revealed as significantly riskier" than their accom-
panying interest rates and ratings suggested.194
ii. Rating Agencies Cannot Bite the Hand that Feeds Them
In addition to the sheer difficulty of rating CLO bonds, the ratings
process is fraught with conflicts of interest.195 Foremost among these is the
"issuer pays" conflict.196 This conflict exists because the CLO issuer is
responsible for requesting and paying the agencies to rate the CLO's
bonds.197 Therefore, the rating agency has an incentive to rate the bonds
favorably so that the issuer will reward the agency with future ratings re-
quests.198 Furthermore, in many cases, the ratings agencies have little or no
187. Id
188. Coval, supra note 49, at 9.
189. Banzaca, supra note 176, at 1.
190. Id.
191. Ou & Emery, supra note 9, at 2.
192. Banzaca, supra note 176, at 1.
193. Ou & Emery, supra note 9, at 1.
194. Banzaca, supra note 176, at 1.
195. Jeffrey A. Barrack, SEC:Rating Agencies Suffer From Conflicts of Interest, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202424079090.
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separation between the analysts responsible for assigning the ratings and
the employees responsible for negotiating fees.199 In its Report on Credit
Ratings, the Securities and Exchange Commission cited one example in
which "senior analytical managers" could also "participate directly in fee
discussions with issuers." 200 Finally, the "issuer pays" model encourages
the issuer to "shop" amongst the ratings agencies to see which agency will
assign the highest ratings to its CLO bonds.201
Market participants overestimated rating agencies' ability to analyze
multiple tranches of bonds that are collateralized by hundreds of diversified
bank loans. In addition, ratings agencies may have skewed their analyses
towards favorable ratings because of inefficiencies like the "issuer pays"
conflict. CLO managers took advantage of the inflated ratings on their
bonds by marketing them to institutional investors who could not have
invested but for the investment-grade ratings. Effectively, institutional in-
vestors flooded corporate borrowers with inexpensive capital to which they
would not have otherwise had access.
Subsection C of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act addresses some of the
most problematic deficiencies in the ratings process. 202 But, Subsection C
will do nothing to alleviate the dependence on ratings. A fundamental flaw
of CLOs, and more generally, all securitized products, is their over-reliance
on asset ratings. For example, ratings agencies have the power to determine
which investors can buy certain assets. Where the agencies assign ratings
that are not "investment-grade," most institutional investors cannot pur-
chase that particular asset.203 Also, the asset's rating determines its pricing;
investors require higher rates of return for taking the risks associated with
lower-rated assets. Effectively, without ratings, the securitization market
could not function.
While ratings can be a valuable tool, they should not be the foundation
of a $13 trillion global market.204 The Dodd-Frank Act's risk retention
199. Id at 24.
200. Id
201. Stuart Gittleman, U.S. Senator Urges Scrapping 'Fundamentally Flawed' Issuer-Pay Credit-
Rating Model, THOMSON REUTERS ACCELUS, (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.complinet.com/dodd-
frank/news/articles/article/us-senator-urges-scrapping-fundamentally-flawed-issuer-pay-credit-rating-
model.html (quoting Senator Franken).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (as amended by Dodd-Frank Act §932).
203. Borrus et al., supra note 70, at 39.
204. See ASSOCIATION FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE, Figure 2.3 (2011),
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/reports/2011 /europe-securitisation/europe-securitisation-
quarterly-2011-08-24-afme-sifma.pdf. As of the end of 2010, the total outstanding balance for securiti-
zations in Europe was EUR 2,092.6, and the total outstanding in the U.S. was EUR 7,839.9; converting
EUR to USD at the 2010 year-end exchange rate of $1.33/1 EUR yields a total securitization market
size of $13.2 trillion.
2012] 959
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
requirements can alleviate some of the reliance on the ratings system. In
CLOs, for example, managers who retain credit risk will rely more upon
their own due diligence and less upon ratings. Moreover, if CLO managers
retain credit risk, they will not organize and initiate transactions that are
based on non-transparent and faulty ratings assumptions.
2. Credit Risk Retention Aligns Incentives
In addition to exploiting a faulty ratings system, CLO managers do not
always have the same interests as their investors. If CLO managers retain
credit risk, their incentives will be aligned with investors who buy their
bonds. CLO bond investors, especially institutions, want stable returns and
limited volatility over the life of their investment. By contrast, CLO man-
agers can be lured by short-term gains that come from investing in riskier
assets. Furthermore, managers are compensated regardless of the perfor-
mance of the underlying loan pool. 205
While CLO managers usually earn their compensation through a mul-
ti-part fee structure,206 this does not incentivize the manager in the same
way as risk retention would. Typically, the manager earns a base fee that is
senior to all of the claims of the bondholders.207The base fee is usually
between ten and twenty basis points per annum, multiplied by the outstand-
ing principal balance of the collateral pool. 208 Therefore, the larger the
collateral pool, the larger the manager's base fee. Moreover, if the manager
buys lower quality assets at a discount, the base fee is not diminished.
Thereby, the manager has an incentive to buy lower quality assets that are
trading below their par value; the base fee rewards quantity over quality.
This fee is similar to a base fee that typical hedge fund managers, or even
mutual fund managers, earn on their assets under management. Unlike
mutual fund or hedge fund investors, however, investors in CLO bonds
usually cannot withdraw their investment if they are unhappy with the CLO
manager's performance. The only timely way that CLO bondholders can
recover their investments is to sell their interest to other investors. 209
205. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 6 (explaining that CLO managers earn a base fee
that has priority over interest payments to bondholders; regardless of whether the bondholders get their
interest payment, the CLO manager earns the base fee).
206. FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 46-47.
207. Id.
208. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 6.
209. FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 17, at 47 Unlike hedge funds and mutual funds that can theoreti-
cally exist in perpetuity, CLOs have definitive start dates and maturity dates. CLO bondholders receive
periodic interest and principal payments throughout the life of the CLO, and they receive the remainder
of their principal at maturity.
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In addition to the base fee, the manager can earn fees that are subordi-
nate to the claims of the noteholders, but senior to the equity holders. 210
These subordinated fees are usually between thirty and forty basis points of
the outstanding principal balance of the collateral pool. 211 Like the base
fee, the subordinated fee incentivizes the CLO manager to buy quantity
over quality. Although the manager only receives the subordinated fee after
all bond investors receive their interest payments, the manager can manipu-
late the loan portfolio to achieve large short-term gains at the expense of
longer-term performance. For example, the CLO manager could load the
portfolio with loans that pay monthly interest, but only pay principal at
maturity. While interest-only loans are riskier investments, this scheme
would help ensure that the manger would receive at least some subordinat-
ed fees.
CLO management fee structures do not adequately align the interests
of the CLO manger and the bond investors. By contrast, the Dodd-Frank
Act's credit risk retention provisions give managers strong incentives to
make prudent investment decisions on behalf of themselves and their inves-
tors. Where CLO managers "retain a material amount of risk," they have
"skin in the game" and their economic interests are aligned with those of
investors.212
B. Risk Retention for CLOs Will Not Stifle the National Economy
Risk retention is an effective means of improving the structural ineffi-
ciencies of CLOs. In addition, imposing risk retention requirements on
CLO managers will not harm the national economy. Risk retention will not
cause the CLO market to become extinct by forcing CLO managers to in-
vest money that they do not have. Furthermore, while CLOs provide an
abundance of capital to the syndicated bank loan market, other lenders can
fill any voids in their absence.
1. Risk Retention Will Not Destroy CLO Managers
Critics of Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act argue that CLO manag-
ers do not have the resources to hold a five percent stake in either the un-
derlying loan pool or the CLO bonds.213 In a survey conducted by the
LSTA, eighty-seven percent of the surveyed CLO managers reported that
they did not have the capital to meet the five percent risk retention thresh-
210. FRB REPORT, supra note 47, at 47.
211. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 7.
212. S.REP.No. 111-176,at 129(2010).
213. The Impact ofRisk Retention on CLOs, supra note 165, at 2-3.
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old.214 Ironically, however, the LSTA also argues that CLO managers
should not be subject to risk retention because they already hold some of
the CLOs equity.215 Presumably, the LSTA is arguing that CLO managers
can afford to hold some credit risk, but they cannot afford to hold the five
percent that Section 941 mandates.
The LSTA also argues that "CLO managers are simply asset manag-
ers; they are not themselves sources of capital." 216 This argument suggests
that CLO managers are akin to mutual fund managers. As this note ex-
plained earlier, however, CLO bondholders cannot exit their investment on
demand in the same way that a mutual fund investor can. Accordingly,
regulators must hold CLO managers to more stringent standards. Further-
more, if the existing CLO managers do not have enough capital to retain
risk, various large hedge funds "have the personnel and infrastructure in
place to manage CLOs today or with minor adjustments." 217 Regardless of
whether CLO managers have the capital to retain five percent of the CLO's
credit risk, they will either have to adjust their business models accordingly
or exit the CLO management business.
2. Risk Retention Will Not Choke the Syndicated Bank Loan Market
Even if CLOs cease to exist, that would not signal the end of the syn-
dicated bank loan market. Touting the merits of syndicated bank loans, the
LSTA noted, "[tihe loan market itself is more transparent than the markets
for many other types of assets." 218 Assuming that syndicated bank loans are
"priced and structured in an attractive way,"219 borrowers should have no
trouble attracting investors outside of the CLO market. For example,
BlackRock Inc., "the world's largest asset manager," recently opined that
insurers such as Aflac Inc. and Everest Re Group Ltd. are ready to invest
214. See id. "[O]nly 13% of respondents (by count) said that they could retain 5% risk in a vertical
pro rata strip." A vertical pro rata strip is one of the permissible methods of credit risk retention under
the proposed rules. This method of risk retention requires the collateral manager to hold 5% of each
class of CLO bonds. While the vertical strip is only one of five methods of risk retention that the Pro-
posed Rules allow, it would likely be a popular choice because it would be the simplest form for
securitizers to implement.
According to the LSTA sample of collateral managers, only 13% said they had the capital to retain 5%
of the credit risk. On the other hand, "87% of the CLO managers said they could retain some amount of
equity/first loss position.
215. Id. at 4 The LSTA reports that "CLO managers contributed average equity of roughly 1.7% of
the face value of their CLOs."
216. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 15.
217. Banzaca, supra note 176, at 1.
218. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 5.
219. Id.
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billions of dollars in syndicated bank loans. 220 Moreover, syndicated bank
loans existed long before CLOs became their dominant sources of capi-
tal.221
The Dodd-Frank Act's credit risk retention requirements will not stifle
economic growth. A robust capital market will always exist for "blue-chip
companies like IBM" and smaller growth-oriented companies like Sizzling
Platter. 222 If CLOs are structurally sound and transparent, they will contin-
ue to attract quality managers, regardless of risk retention requirements. On
the other hand, if CLOs are merely a mechanism of turning junk-rated lev-
eraged loans into investment-grade bonds, then it is imperative that
securitizers have "skin in the game."
CONCLUSION
More than three years after the Tribune Company went bankrupt,
CLOs that owned its syndicated loans still do not have a resolution to their
claims.223 While CLOs may be an important source of capital to the syndi-
cated bank loan market, they can also lead to irresponsible lending practic-
es. The Dodd-Frank Act's risk retention requirement is a sound method of
ensuring that CLO managers do not stray too far from practical investment
principles. Moreover, the regulatory Agencies' proposed rules are a sensi-
ble approach to implementing risk retention. How many CLO managers
would have bought Tribune Company syndicated loans if they had been
required to retain a portion of those loans on their own books? The national
economy cannot withstand another credit crisis fueled by opaque and un-
regulated financial instruments.
220. Noah Buhayer & Richard Bravo, BlackRock Says Insurers May Be 'Next Phase' of Loan
Capital, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-
28/blackrock-says-insurers-may-be-next-phase-of-loan-capital.html.
221. Compare Yago & McCarthy, supra note 27, at 3 (showing the growth and development of the
syndicated loan market from 1987 to 2004), with ZANDI, supra note 55 (explaining that CLOs became
prevalent in the early 2000s, "in the wake of the tech-stock bust").
222. LSTA Comment Letter, supra note 11, at 4.
223. Michael Oneal, New Twist in Tribune Co. Bankruptcy Case Could Benefit Billionaire Sam
Zell, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 7, 2011).
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